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Abstract 
The mutual working relationship between and amongst the federal, state and local councils in 
Nigeria, just like those of advanced democracies is germane to this study. The paper is an 
empirical theoretical expositions of the chequered relationship that has existed between the 
three tiers of government in Nigeria since political independence in 1960 to date. The 
position of this paper is that the place of local councils as enshrined in the 1999 constitution 
(as amended) is practically honored in the breach than in strict observance. Hence, local 
councils in Nigeria have been highly politicize by the powers that be, and the true position of 
the constitution on the status of the councils are greatly in doubt. Of particular importance in 
this paper is the dynamics of federal, state and local council relations in the erstwhile 
Obasanjo administration and the kind of contradictions the administration posed in the 
corporate affairs of state. The paper concludes that greater autonomy, consensus building, 
adequate constitutional obligations should be granted to local councils to enhance overall best 
practices as well as grassroot transformation and sustainable development. 
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Introduction 
 Inter-government relations involves the relationship, both vertical and horizontal, that 
exists between the various organs and departments within the sovereign government of a 
particular country (Akinsanya, 2005). If we take Nigeria for example, inter-governmental 
relations would mean the relationships existing between the various levels of government 
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from the federal, state to the local government level; between the various ministries and 
parastatals, etc. There are three discernible levels of intergovernmental relations in a unitary 
structure, but six levels are in a Federation like Nigeria. These levels are: 
 
i) Federal –– State Relations 
ii) Federal –– State –– Local Relations 
iii) Federal –– Local Relations 
iv) State –– State (Inter-state) Relations 
v) State –– Local Relations 
vi) Local –– Local (Inter-Local) Relations. 
 
 Any keen observer of the political scene in Nigeria will no doubt agree that federalism 
and inter-governmental relations (IGRs) in the country has been undergoing a series of 
radical changes particularly from an autocratic military system of government to a democratic 
dispensation. Most writers on federalism and inter-governmental relations (IGRs) have often 
seen the American federal system as a cooperative partnership of federal, state and local 
governments (Olugbemi, 1980). That an essential feature of federal states is the division of 
“political power” between the federating (states, cantons, Religions or provinces) and central 
(Federal) governments, with each tier of government having the final say regarding matters 
belonging to its sphere, (Wheare, 1959) assigned to it by the constitution, meaning that 
neither tier can abolish the other. However, inter-governmental refers to different layers of 
government cutting across each other‟s domain of specified authorities, and in which they 
interact cooperatively and/or conflictually to achieve parochial and collective objectives of 
divisional and general government (Dare, 1979). Since the coming into force of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 29
th
 May, which ushered in the Fourth 
Republic, much controversy has been generated with respect to inter-governmental relations. 
 However, how do we examine Nigeria‟s inter-governmental relations in the Fourth 
Republic? As a point of departure, we would examine the theory and practice of federalism 
while section II examines typical models of IGRs and their applicability or otherwise to 
Nigeria‟s federal structure. Section III analyses the status of LGCs in Nigeria‟s IGRs in the 
Fourth Republic. The conclusion then follows. 
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Theory and Practice of Federalism 
 We know as students of political science, that the term federalism has attracted a wide 
variety of meanings and definitions without losing its essential characteristics or content. 
Simply put, federalism connotes a method of power sharing in a political system. Thus, K.C. 
Wheare, a foremost classical writer on this concept and other writers have defined a federal 
state as one in which the Central (National) and state (federating) governments are 
coordinate, namely, that neither tier of government (Central-state/Regional) is subordinate to 
the other in legal authority (Jinadu, 2003). 
The principle of federalism according to Wheare involves certain uncompromising qualities. 
i) The division of powers among levels of government; 
ii) Written constitution showing the division; and 
iii) Co-ordinate supremacy of the two levels of government with regards to their 
respective functions; 
iv) The powers to amend the constitution to be exercised by both levels of government 
acting in cooperation; 
v) Existence of an independent judiciary or body to adjudicate dispute arising from clash 
of powers between the federal and state governments; 
vi) Financial independence of both levels of government as “financial subordination 
makes an end of federalism”. 
After stating these qualities, Wheare unequivocally assert: 
 
I have put forward uncompromisingly a criterion of federal government. The 
delimited and coordinate division of governmental functions and I have implied that 
to the extent to which any system of government does not conform to this criterion, it 
has no claim to call itself federal (Wheare, 1959). 
 
 As was to be expected, Wheare‟s rigid stance attracted many criticisms. His definition 
was criticized as illegalistic, inflexible unrealistic and unworkable as well as neglecting 
certain socio-economic, cultural and political factors that actually affect the dynamics of 
federalism. He was accused of relying excessively on essential features of American 
federalism and thus fell prey, to a kind of historicism (Dudley, 1963). 
 As Akinsanya (2005) rightly noted that no single federation the world over has fully 
embodied the Wheare principles, which essentially, are ideal. To be sure, several factors such 
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as the party system, the economy, particularly, the world economy during and since the 
“Depression” of the 1930s have produced fundamental changes in the practices of 
governments of most federal states including Australia, Canada, India, Switzerland and the  
 
United States. Billy J. Dudley has noted: 
… the layer’s picture of a federal structure as being a formal division of 
sovereign powers in which the federating governments are coordinate in rank 
and independent in function, and exist as equal jurisdictional entities, is very 
unreal in actual practice.  
 
Indeed, Dudley and Akinsanya have observed that: 
The trend in the older federations has been towards increasing federal 
supremacy and authority over the states, province or cantons, most especially 
in the areas of finance and economic planning (1968). 
 As Akinsanya noted, “for the period since independence, and particularly during the 
period of military rule, Federal – state relations in Nigeria “… have been characterized by 
increasing federal supremacy and authority over the states” (2005:10). 
 It should be emphasized that it is the legal framework, the constitution which 
encapsulated the volition on the federal society and thus created the federal system. In the 
absence of this constitution, the federal society could degenerate into any other form of 
societal organization other than a federal one. Thus Amuwo (1999) asserts, “It is 
constitutionalism or it‟s absence that gives rise to different types of federal practice and 
culture”. It therefore becomes the „cognitive map‟ to understanding the nature and culture of 
power and policies in federal system. However, it is within the legal framework provided by 
a federal arrangement particularly its division of governmental powers that federal 
instrumentalities take meaning and significance. The process further sensitizes us to the 
changing and evolving nature of the federal balance of power and to the fact that inter-
governmental cooperation usually cuts across the formal constitutional division of powers 
(Akinsanya, 1989; Diamond, 1993; Ayoade, 2005. 
 
Models of Inter-Governmental Relations and Nigeria 
 Several models of inter-governmental relations have been derived by scholars to guide 
us in understanding IGRs in any political system beyond constitutional delineation of powers 
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(Deid, 1978). The best, and perhaps, the most insightful and significant is the three-fold 
typology formulated by Deil D. Wright, based, as it were, on the authority structure of each 
tier of government which itself is dependent on the totality of executive and financial 
capacities of each level of government. Three models of authority relationships among 
Federal, State and Local Governments in the United States have been discerned by Wright as 
shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
MODELS OF IGRS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 1 2 3 
DESIGNATION 
RELATIONSHIP 
AUTHORITY PATTERN 
COORDINATE 
INDEPENDENT 
AUTONOMY 
OVERLAPPING 
INTERDEPENDENT 
BARGAINING 
INCLUSIVE 
DEPENDENT 
HIERARCHY 
 
 The coordinate Authority model according to Ayoade defines a peripheralised, weak 
or decentralized federalism, reminiscent of the state-centered variant of the Jeffersonian 
school of thought. The center is weakened to strengthen the pheriphery just as in the early 
days of the American Union (Obianyo, 2005). He further asserts that the coordinate authority 
model (CAM) conforms with the dualist or binomial theory of federalism, similar to 
Wheare‟s uncompromising principles and no doubt the coordinate authority model reaffirms 
the dual character of federalism as against the Tripod character introduced in the 1979/1999 
Constitutions of Nigeria. Thus, implied in the dualist model is the subordinate dependent and 
agency status of local government (Dudley, 1968). And this was accorded legal expression in 
the judicial pronouncement of John Forest Dillion, an Iowa judge in the 1960s popularly 
known as the Dillion Rule, which pronounced in 1968 the legal subservience doctrine of local 
governments. He declared, without mincing words: 
 
It must be taken for settled law, that a municipal corporation possesses and 
can exercise the following powers and no other. First those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers 
expressly granted, third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and 
purposes of the corporation not simply convenient, but indispensable, and 
fourth, any fair doubts as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation (cited in Dudley, 1968). 
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 As clearly observed by Akinsanya that “in terms of Federal-state relationship, the 
coordinate Authority Model implies that Federal and states‟ Governments are independent 
and autonomous. And this view was formulated in the Tarbel‟s case (1871), and reinforced 
by the United States‟ Supreme Court‟s decision in National League of Cities V Usery (1976) 
where the court‟s ruled that the United States Congress did not have the authority requiring 
states or their local governments to observe minimum-wage and minimum-hour laws, adding 
that the federal legislation violated the “attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state 
government which may be impaired by congress.” In essence, Akinsanya concludes that, for 
reasons, which are not unrelated to “a growing industrial society of increasing complex and 
interdependent unit”, the coordinate Authority Model of IGRs has become inappropriate and 
undesirable, because the model is addressed to no-existence socio-political conditions. 
 The over-lapping Authority Model of IGRs occupies the median position guaranteeing 
interdependence between the three levels of government and necessitating political bargains 
between them. However, Akinsanya has identified three basic features of this model. First, 
substantial areas of government operations involve Federal, State and Local units (or 
officials) simultaneously. Second, the areas of autonomy and full discretion are 
comparatively small. Third, the power and influence available to any one jurisdiction (or 
official) is significantly small. Obviously, any analysis and interpretation of the overlapping 
Authority Model of IGRs have a clear bias in the direction of cooperation and negotiated 
agreement. This is true of the Nigerian situation, in which the Concurrent List, which should 
have encouraged cooperation between the center and the units, became an avenue for 
evacuating powers from the state and boosting that of the center. 
 The Inclusive Authority Model of IGRs conveys the essential hierarchical nature of 
authority. States and localities are minions or agents of the Federal Government, which, to all 
intents and purposes, is supreme. While it is difficult to ascertain the degree or extent to 
which the Inclusive Authority Model of IGRs is still prevalent in the United States, there is 
little doubt that there has been much movement away from this model through several court 
decisions, congressional statutes and administrative regulations (Jinadu, 2003). 
In an Inclusive Authority Model of IGRs – the extreme variant of the coordinate Authority 
Model is the one in which the states and Local Governments are mere appendages of the  
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Central Government. Hence, Akinsayna (2005) remarked that: 
Federal-State-Local relations in Nigeria between 1966-1979, 1993-1999 were 
characterized not only by the increasing dependence of the states and Local 
Governments on the Federal Government in areas considered an exclusive 
preserve of states and local Governments such as primary – and post-primary 
education. 
  
 He further asserts that in the overlapping Authority model of IGRs, power is dispersed 
between the three tiers of authority as to permit some measure of autonomy enjoyed by the 
different tiers of government capable of independent action in each sphere. Federal-state- 
local relations during the second Republic and the Babangida- Abacha- Abubakar 
Administrations is a combination of overlapping Authority Model and inclusive Authority 
Model of IGRs. The 1979 constitution delineated a three-tiered federation structure in which 
each tier enjoys a considerable measure of independence – jurisdictionally, financially and 
functionally even if some forces appears to tilt the balance of power in favour of the centre, 
and rarely in favour of the federating state and Local Governments. 
 
State-Local Government Relations in the Fourth Republic 
 The 1979 Constitution delineated a three tiered federal structure in which each tier, 
particularly the Federal and states‟ Governments, enjoys a considerable measure of 
independence jurisdictionally, financially, and functionally even if several forces appear to 
tilt the balance of power in favour of the centre, and rarely in favour of states‟ Governments 
and Local Government Councils, and even if constitutional provisions see LGCs as 
subordinates in every material particular to the states‟ Governments (Akinsanya, 2005). 
 As rightly observed by Akinsanya, state Governors not only exercised their powers 
under Section 7(1) of the 1979 Constitution to dissolve “elected” LGCs and replace them 
with sole Administrators or caretaker committees but also created new LGAs. Although the 
constitution enjoined states to pay 10 percent of the statutory revenues to LGCs, very few 
states honoured the provision. In fact, some states forced some LGCs to make contributions 
for the provision of some services like primary education. Additionally, statutory allocations 
from the “Federation Account” to LGCs, paid into states-joint Local Government Account‟ 
were often diverted by some state Governments. By and large, LGCs were emasculated 
through acts of omission or commission by some state Governments. 
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 It is a fact that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ushered in a 
democratically elected regime on May, 29
th
 1999, and the 1979 Constitution, provides for 
three tiers of government: Federal, State and Local, and that each level of government is 
independent in the sense that one level is not subordinate to the other in legal authority. 
Specifically, it has been argued by Akinsanya that: 
Local Government Council are autonomous entities, and therefore, should be 
treated as such. However, the much touted autonomy of LGCs, if that was the 
intention or intendment of the “authors” of the “1976 Local Government 
Reforms”, flies in the face of facts and constitutional provisions (2005:28). 
 
 That the „authors‟ of the 1999 Constitution, like the 1979 Constitution, paid little or 
scant attention to Local government as the third tier of government is no longer in doubt. 
Indeed, from all indications, the local government is the least important of all the three tiers 
of government just like the “Third World is the least important in the comity of nations”. A 
careful examination of the distribution of powers among the three-tiers of government under 
the 1999 Constitution and the practice of Inter-Governmental Relations (IGRs) in the on-
going democratic dispensation, clearly shows the total subordination of Local Government 
Council (LGCs) to the other two tiers of government (centre and federating states). The 
question we now ask is, what then is the Locus of a local government council as the third-tier 
of government in Nigeria? Section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides unambiguously 
that: 
 
The system of local government by democratically elected local government 
council is under this constitution guaranteed. 
 
It adds, and this is very important that:  
Accordingly, the Government of every state shall …… ensure their existence 
under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, 
finance and functions of such councils. 
 
 The contradictions in the provision of the 1999 constitution on local government did 
not help matters, and set the stage for the later struggle between the federal and state 
governments over control of the localities. In 2003, at the height of the struggle and 
European Scientific Journal    September edition vol. 8, No.20   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
 
170 
 
controversy over levels of government, the federal government set-up a technical committee 
on the Review of the structure of local government councils to review and consider the 
desirability or otherwise of retaining local government as the third-tier of government. One of 
the major recommendations of the committee was the reintroduction of the parliamentary 
system at the local government level in view of what it considered the expensive and wasteful 
nature of the presidential system at that level. This, and the landmark Supreme Court ruling 
of 2001 which affirmed state responsibilities for local government, were perhaps the queue 
state governments were waiting for to perform their own experiments. 
 Taking their authority from section 7(1) of the 1999 constitution that guarantees 
democratically elected local councils and empowers state governments to enact laws for the 
“establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions” of the councils, and if section 
128 of the constitution also empowers a State‟s House of Assembly “to direct or cause to be 
directed an inquiry or investigate into – (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has 
power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of the affairs of any person, authority …; charged 
… with the duty of or responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by the 
House of Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be 
appropriated by such House”, then the Dillon‟s Rule enunciated by the Iowa state chief judge 
is apt in describing state-Local Relations in Nigeria (Deil, 1978). In the absence of any 
legislative enactment, and/or constitutional provision to the country, states can determine not 
only the tenure of elected Local Government officials elected prior to the coming into force 
of the 1999 constitution. For a number of reasons, the president (Obasanjo) and the National 
Assembly decided that the 2002 Local Government Elections must be postponed, and this by 
extending the tenure of office of elected local government officials by one year through the 
Electoral Act of 2001 by invoking item 11 of the Concurrent Legislative list providing that: 
 
The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation with respect to the 
registration of voters and the procedure regulating elections to a local 
government councils. 
  
 The word “procedure” was interpreted, and albeit wrongly to include timing of the 
election and tenure of those elected in order to justify the extension of the tenure of elected 
local government officials notwithstanding the provisions of sections 312(2) of the 1999 
Constitution which states that: 
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Any person who before the coming into force of this constitution was elected 
to any elective office mentioned in this constitution in accordance with the 
provisions of any other law in force immediately before the coming into force 
of this constitution shall be deemed to have been duly elected to that office 
under this constitution (Jinadu, 2005:30). 
 As Akinsanya rightly noted that all efforts made to convince members of the relevant 
committees of the National Assembly, that they don‟t have such powers, and would be 
ultravires fell on deaf ears. When the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the provisions 
and ruled that the National Electoral Commission, a federal executive body, which had been 
conducting bye-elections to fill vacancies in some states‟ Assemblies refused, failed or 
neglected to make available to the states‟ Independent National Electoral Commissions the 
voters Register to conduct Local government elections due in March 2002, and at the end of 
the day, President Obasanjo and states‟ Governors agreed to an unconstitutional procedure of 
appointing for two years caretaker, interim or transition Local Government Councils contrary 
to the provisions of Section 7 (1) of the constitution guaranteeing “the system of Local 
government by democratically elected local government council.” 
 It is obvious that that 1999 Constitution is more elaborate than the 1979 Constitution 
in its provisions on Local government with specific reference to number of local governments 
in Nigeria and the method of creating new ones. Obviously an off-shoot of Babangida‟s 1989, 
constitution which significantly curtailed state rights in Local government matters, the 1999 
Constitution made it very difficult for states to exercise absolute jurisdiction changing the 
boundaries of local government, by not only stipulating the number of local government 
(774) in existence in Nigeria and mentioning them in part I of the First Schedule but also 
gave the National Assembly the power of assent in the events of creation of more local 
governments by any state. As Obianyo (2005) rightly observed that: 
 
It would appear that the military regimes after creating many local 
governments put a seal to more creation by any state by including the names 
of local government in the constitution to make more creation difficult as it 
being experienced in Nigeria today. 
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 Obviously, only states can create new Local Government Areas pursuant to section 8 
(3) of the constitution, and as if the constitution does not envisage, contemplate, nor 
anticipate the creation of new states and LGAs pursuant to Section 8 (1) and Section (3) of 
the constitution. Specifically, Section 7 (1) of the constitution empowers a state Government 
to enact a law providing for the 
 
Establishment, structure, composition, financial and functions of such councils. 
 It should however be stated that the case of the impasse between the Lagos state 
governments and the federal government in 2004 which was widely celebrated one. The 
different interpretation that was given by the two parties to Section 8 (5) and 8(6) as to 
whether Lagos state has satisfied or fulfilled the provisions of the constitution in relation to 
the afore-stated sections led to a constitutional crisis. The crisis is significant in view of 
former President Obasanjo‟s refusal to release the federal allocation to local governments in 
Lagos state on the grounds of violation of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. On the directives of President Olusegun Obasanjo to the Minister of Finance in April 
2004, to states that created additional LGAs; 
 
No allocation from the federation account should henceforth be released to 
the Local government councils of above mentioned states (and any other that 
may fall into that category until they revert back to their local government 
areas specified in part one of the first schedule of the constitution (Obasanjo 
2005). 
 
 The affected states were Lagos, Ebonyi Katsina, Niger and Nasarawa. The affected 
sections of the 1999 Constitution with reference to federal revenue to Local government and 
state are as stated in section 162(3) viz: 
  An amount standing to the credit of the Federal Account shall be distributed among 
the Federal and state governments and local government councils in each state on such term 
and in such a manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
Sec 162(5)  
 The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the federation 
account shall also be allocated to the states for the benefit of their Local Government 
Councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
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Sec 162(6) 
 Each states shall maintain a special account to called “state joint Local government 
account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the Local government councils of the state 
from the federation account and from the government of the state. 
Sec 162(7)  
 Each state shall pay to Local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such 
proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the 
National Assembly. 
Sec 162(8)  
 The amount standing to the credit of Local government councils of a state shall be 
distributed among the local government councils of that state in such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of the state. 
 The Lagos state took the federal government to court on this matter, and prayed the 
court to determine whether or not there is power vested in the president of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (by executive administrative action) to “suspend or withhold for any 
period whatever the statutory allocation due and payable to the Lagos state government, 
pursuant to the provision of Section 162(5) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. 
 
On December 10, 2004, in a lead judgement by the chief Justice of Nigeria Muhammadu 
Lawal Uwais, the Supreme Court, in Attorney-General of Lagos State V Attorney-General of 
the Federation, ruled: 
 
(a) The federal government has no power, either by executive or administrative action, to 
suspend or withhold for any period what so ever, the statutory allocations due and payable to 
Lagos state government pursuant of the provision of Section 162 (8) of the 1999 constitution. 
(b) Such withholding of due allocations is unlawful and contrary to the provisions of the 
1999 Constitution. The chief Justice Uwais maintained further that the creation of new Local 
government areas or councils is supported by the provision of the constitution. 
  
 Justice Samson Uwaifo‟s comment was more explicit, and caustic: “It does not appear 
to me that there is any power contained by the president to withhold any allocation on the 
basis of a conceived breach of the constitution.” 
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 Justice Niki Tobi on his part asked a rhetorical question: “does the president have 
right to stop the release of funds to the councils?” I think not”. He notes that, “section 162(9) 
of the Constitution or any other section for that matter does not provide for the stoppage of 
allocation from the federation account to the local government councils of Lagos or any other 
state”. Justice Idris Lagbo Kutigi also asserts “Nowhere in the constitution is the president 
expressly or impliedly authorized to suspend or withhold the statutory allocations payable to 
Lagos state pursuant to section 162(5) of the constitution, on the ground of complaints made 
against Lagos state by the Federal government in this section or any ground at all. If the 
president has any grievance against any tier of government, he shall go to court. He cannot 
kill them by withholding their allocation. 
 In essence, the Lagos State Government was right in creating new LGAs, while 
president Obasanjo has no power to suspend/withhold statutory grants due to Lagos State 
Government for benefit of its Local Government Council. True, is it that the Supreme Court 
ruled that the statutory grants withheld are meant for the benefit of 20 LGAs but not 57 LGAs 
since they cannot come into operation until the National Assembly passes an Act amending 
Section 3(6) of the constitution and part 1 of the first schedule to the constitution? The 
Federal Government refused, failed or neglected to release these grants to the Lagos State 
Government on the spurious grounds that the LASG is likely to use the grants for the benefit 
of 57 LGAs, and not 20 LGAs recognized by the constitution, thus, raising serious questions 
whether the president is above the law and/or whether the president is not in serious violation 
or breach of the provisions of the constitution. 
 It seems the president has an ass to grind with Lagos state, as it did not withhold the 
statutory allocation of other states like Yobe state which did exactly what Lagos did. Yobe 
created additional 23 Local governments in addition to its earlier 17 bringing the total to 40 
Local governments but was never penalized by the Federation government. The other states 
e.g, Ebonyi, Katsina, Nasarawa and Niger turned their respective new Local government 
areas (LGAs) into what they called „Development Areas (Obianyo, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
 There is no doubt that local government councils are in the best position to play a 
major role in the grassroots development of our society. As the nearest government to the 
people, much is expected of it hence the need for an effective and result-oriented 
administration. In Nigeria, for example, inter-governmental pressure would mean the 
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relationship existing between the various levels of government from the federal, state to the 
Local government level. In other words, the assessment here is about the whole essence of 
government, its various organs and departments with a view of ascertaining the use of force 
or exert of influence or lobby and the level of systematic functional harmony or otherwise. 
 We have carefully examined the Locus of local government councils in Nigeria‟s 
Inter-governmental relations in the Fourth Republic under the 1999 Constitution, using as our 
framework of analysis, Deil Wright‟s models of IGRs, in the United States. Our study vividly 
shows that although Section 7(1) of the Constitution states that the “system of local 
government by democratically elected local government council is guaranteed”, it empowers 
a state‟s House of Assembly to make laws to ensure their existence, structure, finances and 
functions, thus “detracting from the desired constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.” It is in 
the area of finance that the subordination of LGCs to the centre and federating states is more 
encompassing. While the law is very clear as to which tier has the power to create new 
LGAs, it is equally clear that the president (executive rascality) has no powers to seize 
statutory grants from the Federal Account simply because the newly – created LGAs are yet 
to become operative pursuant to section 8(5) of the constitution. 
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